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In December 2016, shortly after the US presidential election, Facebook
and five US news and fact-checking organizations—ABC News, Associ-
ated Press, FactCheck.org, PolitiFact, and Snopes—entered a partnership
to combat misinformation. Motivated by a variety of concerns and values,
relying on different understandings of misinformation, and with a diverse
set of stakeholders in mind, they created a collaboration designed to lever-
age the partners’ different forms of cultural power, technological skill, and
notions of public service.
Concretely, the partnership centers around managing a flow of stories
that may be considered false. Here’s how it works: through a proprietary
process that mixes algorithmic and human intervention, Facebook identifies
candidate stories; these stories are then served to the five news and fact-
checking partners through a partners-only dashboard that ranks stories
according to popularity. Partners independently choose stories from the
dashboard, do their usual fact-checking work, and append their fact-checks
to the stories’ entries in the dashboards. Facebook uses these fact-checks to
adjust whether and how it shows potentially false stories to its users.
Variously seen as a public relations stunt, a new type of collaboration,
or an unavoidable coupling of organizations through circumstances be-
yond either’s exclusive control, the partnership emerged as a key example
of platform-publisher collaboration. This report contextualizes the part-
nership, traces its dynamics through a series of interviews, and uses it to
motivate a general set of questions that future platform press partnerships
might ask themselves before collaborating.
Key findings
While the partnership is ostensibly devoted only to fact-checking, I also find
it can be read as:
• tensions among multiple origin stories and motivations
• competition among varied organizational priorities
• different assumptions about access and publicness
• exertions of leverage and different types of power
• establishment of categories and standards
• negotiations among different types of scale
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• competing rhythms and timelines of action
• experiments in automation and “practice capture”
• varied understandings of impact and success
• ongoing and unevenly distributed management of change
Taken together, these dynamics suggest a more general model of partner-
ship between news organizations and technology companies—an image of
what platform-press collaboration looks like and how it is negotiated.
I must emphasize that although it is the study’s central backdrop, this
project is not about “fake news.” It is about the values and tensions under-
lying partnerships between news organizations and technology companies.
Beyond the particular example I focus on in this report, such partner-
ships have often existed, are likely to continue, and now influence many of
the conditions under which journalists work, the way news circulates, and
how audiences interpret stories. The press’s public accountability, technol-
ogists’ responsibilities, and journalists’ ethics will increasingly emerge not
from any single organization or professional tradition; rather they will be
shaped through partnerships that, explicitly and tacitly, signal which met-
rics of success, forms of expertise, types of power, and standards of quality
are expected and to be encouraged.
Most broadly, and as a set of concluding recommendations details, such
partnerships between news organizations and technology companies need
to grapple with their public obligations. Publishers and platforms may
see themselves as strictly private entities with the freedom to join or leave
partnerships, define for themselves their public responsibilities, and make
independent judgments about what is best for their users and readers. But
when they meet and occupy such central positions in media systems, they
create a new type of power that needs a new kind of scrutiny. An almost
unassailable, opaque, and proprietarily guarded collective ability to create
and circulate news, and to signal to audiences what can believed—this kind
of power cannot live within any single set of self-selected, self-regulating




The partnership between Facebook and news and fact-checking
organizations—hereafter simply referred to as “the partnership”—originally
emerged from, and continues to exist amidst, a complex set of cultural and
technological forces that go well beyond the bounds or control of any one of
its members. Though focused on a particular practice and relatively small
set of organizations, the partnership does not exist in isolation, and its
significance and dynamics cannot easily be bracketed.
Before discussing the interviews I conducted with partnership members,
I want to place the partnership in context, briefly reviewing forces that,
although not always explicitly discussed by interviewees, create the partner-
ship’s sociotechnical backdrop.
History and Definitions of ‘Fake
News’
Fake news is nothing new. Writing in Harper’s Magazine in 1925, in an
era when modern rituals of journalistic professionalism were just emerging,
journalism schools were still new, and the press was struggling to distin-
guish itself from public relations agents, Associated Press editor Edward
McKernon worried that what “makes the problem of distributing accurate
news all the more difficult is the number of people—a number far greater
than most readers realize—who are intent on misinforming the public for
their own ends. The news editor has to contend not only with rumor,
but with the market rigger, the news faker, the promoter of questionable
projects, and some of our best citizens obsessed with a single idea.”1
McKernon’s worry back then was not even new. From the seventeenth
through nineteenth centuries, partisan pamphleteers, coureurs (singers who
ran among towns spread falsities through song), artists and photographers,
in both Europe and the United States, capitalized on relatively low liter-
acy rates, changes in media technologies, and seemingly insatiable public
appetites for sensationalism to deceive audiences across a variety of media.
Writers and journalists in each era struggled with how to make claims
about the realities of their worlds, how to defend themselves against charges
of deception, how to create words and imagery that would resist misin-
terpretation and manipulation, how to hold powerful people accountable
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through irrefutable facts,2 3 4 5 6 and how to be both fact-makers and fact-
checkers with political power.7 And media scholars watching the emergence
of the early world wide web echoed these concerns, observing that online
“facts more easily escape from their creator’s or owner’s control and, once
unleashed, can be bandied about.”8
Surveying a vast amount of contemporary literature on how facts are
made and checked in online environments, RAND researchers describe a
general phenomenon they call “truth decay,” with four dimensions:
• “an increasing disagreement about facts and analytical interpretations of
facts and data;
• a blurring of the line between opinion and fact;
• an increase in the relative volume, and resulting influence, of opinion and
personal experience over fact;
• and lowered trust in formerly respected sources of factual information.”9
Implicit in this model of today and each era’s debates over the creation
and circulation of facts are discussions about what exactly it meant for a
piece of information to be fake or untrue. Summarizing scholarship from a
variety of fields, Caroline Jack offers the following typology, giving precision
to contemporary debates about “fake news”:
• Misinformation: “information whose inaccuracy is unintentional”
• Disinformation: “information that is deliberately false or misleading”
• White vs. gray vs. black propaganda: “systematic information
campaigns that are deliberately manipulative or deceptive” and that
vary in the degree to which sources are known and named
• Gaslighting: deceptions that stop victims from “trusting their own
judgments and perceptions”
• Dezinformatsiya: a Soviet phenomenon in which the state dissemi-
nates “false or misleading information to the media in targeted countries
or regions”
• Xuanchuan: a Chinese term used to describe flooding online “conversa-
tional spaces with positive messages or attempts to change the subject”
• Satire, parody, hoax, and culture jamming: the use of misinforma-
tion for cultural critique and commentary10
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In a complementary model, Claire Wardle similarly argues against using
the term “fake news,”11 not only because it has become a cliché and con-
venient way for politicians (often President Trump) to dismiss information
they dislike, but because it confuses contexts, meanings, and intentions
that need to be named and distinguished if online media systems are to be
places for high-quality communication and collective self-government. She
rightly renames “fake news” as a space of discourse and actors, populated
by different types of information, and by a variety of motivations.
Figure 1: Types of mis- and disinformation, mapped to motivations. Taken from
Wardle (2017).
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Focused on how the term “fake news” appears within news and news ad-
vertising, and how journalists seem to understand the concept, Edson Tan-
doc, Zheng Wei Lim, and Richard Ling similarly find that the term is best
understood as an interplay between types of media representations—how
claims to the truth or attempts to deceive appear in words or imagery—
and an author’s intentions, creating a map of contemporary news genres
implicated by misinformation:12
Figure 2: A typology of fake news definitions. Taken from Tandoc et al. (2017).
My aim is not to adopt any one of these typologies or argue their rela-
tive merits. Rather, it is to highlight that the partnership exists within a
longstanding history and complex space of definitions of fact-checking.
Institutionalized Fact-Checking
These histories and debates have relatively recently crystalized into pat-
terns of action performed by a distributed and increasingly professionalized
community of fact-checkers, organized, for example, through the Interna-
tional Fact-Checking Network.13 As Graves chronicles in his foundational
study of both the history of US fact-checking and its emergence as a sub-
field of political journalism, fact-checkers “see themselves as a distinct pro-
fessional cohort—a self-described fact-checking movement within journal-
ism” with members in major broadcasting networks, online newsrooms, and
papers big and small.14 Often collaborating with each other, fact-checkers
practice journalism in the networked mode. They link promiscuously to
outside news sources, encourage other reporters to cite their work, and
Columbia Journalism School
Introduction 11
strike distribution deals with major media organizations. Fact-checkers have
achieved a high profile in elite media-political networks.15
Researchers further tell us that fact-checking emerges when governance and
communications institutions are perceived to be weak.16 They have uncov-
ered variations in journalists’ fact-checking and verification practices—e.g.,
some focus on confirming more easily verifiable information like names and
numbers over more complex causal claims; some routinely pass on unver-
ified and unattributed information assuming that a colleague will do the
fact-check; and others create a closed, circular process in which verification
only refers to a journalist’s earlier work.17
Additionally, journalists are often skeptical about whether certain
kinds of facts and fact-checking practices will be seen as professionally
acceptable—when thinking about if or how to fact-check, they think about
their owners’ and publishers’ missions, and how their colleagues will per-
ceive verification.18 19 And while they are often ambivalent about the utility
of fact-checking tools and services,20 they largely express a desire to fact-
check, seeing it not just as a professionally responsible move, but also as a
way to distinguish themselves from lower-status reporters, signaling their
affiliation with an elite and prestigious world of verified truth-telling.21
Beyond fact-checking within stories, especially in online contexts, there
are active debates about whether and how to refute false information that
has already been published. There is uncertainty surrounding whether post-
hoc fact-checks change audiences’ beliefs or actions22 and whether labeling
an article as disputed and showing audiences related information makes
people more or less willing to change their beliefs.23 24 Such dynamics are
also wrapped up in audiences’ feelings about the media as a whole and
how they perceive themselves: some of the willingness to accept corrections
depends upon how much people trust the media.25 Some people share news
that they know to be misleading, false, and or confusing26 because their
relationship to news is not defined by rationally processing claims and
counter-claims, but on deciding how well information and narratives align
with their self-identities, affiliations, and desires.27 Trafficking in false news
is not about logical exchange of claims and counter-claims, it is about who
people see themselves as, who they believe they are or want to be.
A complete review of this large and fast-changing literature is beyond
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the scope of this report, but the general point stands: fact-checking is its
own subfield of journalism with a diversity of goals, values, and practices;
journalists themselves are sometimes unclear about what role fact-checking
can or should play in their work; and, especially in online environments,
there is active debate about how and when fact-checking should engage
audiences. A partnership designed at the intersection of institutionalized
fact-checking and the world’s largest social media platform cannot avoid
these dynamics.
A Networked, Liminal, Platform
Press
These histories of misinformation, debates about its power and remedies,
and a diverse institutional field of fact-checkers are complicated by a lack
of agreement over what “the press” means anymore. It can be difficult to
argue precisely that fact-checkers are a subfield of journalism, when the
press—the institutional forces that shape how journalists work, informa-
tion circulates, and audiences interpret news—is currently populated by
so many different characters. This new entity is variously called the “net-
worked press,”28 the “liminal press,”29 “online distribution networks,”30 the
“hybrid media system,”31 and the “platform press.”32
There is increasing recognition that the conditions under which jour-
nalists work, news is produced, and information circulates are defined not
only by journalists, their sources, markets, and the state, but also by tech-
nologists, software designers, databases, and algorithms that influence how
news is made and made meaningful, through both human judgment and
computational processes.
Additionally, news organizations are entering into partnerships among
themselves.33 For example:
• Panama Papers consortium34
• ProPublica’s numerous partnerships with other news organizations and
collaboration with audiences on everything from fighting hate speech to
explaining election processes35
• technology-focused partnerships36 like Facebook’s Instant Articles,
SnapChat’s Discover, Google’s Accelerated Mobile Pages, Twitter’s Am-
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plify, and Amazon’s discounted access for subscribers to The Washington
Post
• Tech and Check Cooperative’s project to bring together universities, the
Internet Archive, and Google for automated, real-time fact-checking on
the US State of the Union address37
• First Draft’s CrossCheck Newsroom project that convenes technology
companies (Google and Facebook are partners), international news or-
ganizations, and online metrics and analytics companies to fight the
circulation of misinformation38
There is a seemingly endless set of strategic, experimental relationships
between platforms and publishers that can make it difficult to tell where
media publishers end and technology companies start. Fact-checking is
quickly expanding beyond a relatively small set of news organizations to
include new actors who do not necessarily share journalistic training or
practices.
Sometimes, though, these distinctions are easier to see. For example,
though it has repeatedly stated its support for the news industry and en-
tered partnerships with various publishers and media researchers, Facebook
has earned the ire of journalists and publishers around the world when it
has unilaterally changed how news appears on its platform.
In October 2017, in six countries, it moved the “non-promoted posts”
(i.e., unpaid) that many news organizations used to distribute content on
the platform out of the main Facebook newsfeed. Many publications—
especially small and non-elite publishers which relied heavily on Facebook
distribution—reported immediate drops of sixty to eighty percent in Face-
book engagement with its stories.39 In March 2018, Facebook announced
that it was ending the experiment and “acknowledged the criticism that [it]
had acted high-handedly by completely changing the media landscape for
six countries without warning or input from stakeholders.”40
In January 2018, in an attempt to help users “have more meaningful
social interactions,”41 Facebook announced that it would, among other
changes, show people fewer news articles, marketing messages, and ad-
vertisements42—grouping these types of content as inconsistent with the
company’s mission to increase people’s “happiness and health.”43 Later that
same month, the company announced a two-question survey it designed to
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help it determine the quality and trustworthiness of news organizations by
aggregating and analyzing users’ responses, presumably using the data to
algorithmically rank news content.
And most recently, Zuckerberg refined Facebook’s earlier newsfeed re-
vision deprioritizing news to say that the company would “promote news
from local sources.”44 In each move, although the company often acknowl-
edges the need for transparency, promises to give more notice, and engage
better consultation, it also signals that, despite partnerships with news
organizations, it retains solo control over how news circulation on its plat-
form will be judged relevant, meaningful, and trustworthy—and that it will
update judgments as it determines.
These tensions—between how publishers and platforms understand news
content—play out amidst larger conversations about the power and re-
sponsibilities of platforms writ large. Although platforms like Facebook
and Google give people ways to export their data, they effectively act as
a duopoly: it is practically impossible to avoid the platforms and be total
non-users.45 They control approximately sixty to seventy percent of US
advertising market share,46 and it is virtually impossible for new social
network sites to emerge and compete.47
Having achieved this awesome power, platform companies are constantly
negotiating. Insisting that they are technology makers and not media or-
ganizations, they resist calls that they be regulated like quasi utilities and
held accountable to public interest standards. Yet to remain consistent with
the message they send to advertisers and investors that they are powerful,
effective, and efficient controllers of public attention, they must acknowl-
edge their power and attempt a kind of self-regulation that is variously seen
as a sincere attempt at accepting media-like responsibility or a strategic
delaying tactic meant to ward off formal oversight.484950
And while simultaneously creating and struggling under the complexities
of such global scale, platforms filter users through proprietary content mod-
eration rules—privately maintained policies designed and implemented to
reflect the platform’s terms of service and its definitions of community stan-
dards, not necessarily openly debated public interests or journalistic val-
ues.51 52 They effectively carve out for themselves a new kind of sovereign
capitalism by creating massive, opaquely maintained rules that are almost
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impossible for people to avoid, understand, or hold accountable through ex-
isting models of governance.53 Appreciating that transparency alone is often
insufficient for public accountability,54 media researchers are often stuck
calling for algorithmic transparency,55 56 trying to access and understand
platform data,57 designing ways of auditing platforms without having to
ask permission,58 and pushing for regulatory reforms that would let them
do so legally.59
Platform-publisher relationships are not always innocuous or easily fixed.
For example, in 2017 Facebook was heavily criticized as the platform was
being used to spread misinformation across Myanmar (a country where
the number of Facebook users exploded from two million in 2014 to thirty
million in 2017). Media researchers and aid groups watched as Burmese
government officials and others used the platform to spread propaganda
and disinformation. Human rights groups said that the government took
advantage of Facebook’s ubiquity, algorithmic priorities, scant apprecia-
tion of local language and culture, and disempowered opposition groups
to organize and accelerate ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Rohingya
minority.60
Meanwhile, regulatory attempts are not always straightforward or de-
sirable. While Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act gives
platforms considerable freedom to moderate content according to internal
company policies in the United States, the new German “NetzDG” law—
designed to minimize the online circulation of false and harmful speech—
gives platforms twenty-four hours to remove “obviously illegal” content
before facing fines. Critics charge that the law will backfire, incentivizing
platforms to make broad and sweeping determinations about speech and
err on the side of censorship, ultimately working against public oversight by
leaving questions “that require legal expertise. . .delegated to tech compa-
nies.”61
Though not always narrowly focused on fact-checking, these partner-
ships, content commissions, algorithmic changes, and community surveys
point to uneven relationships between social media platforms—Facebook in
particular—and news publishers. Together they determine conditions under
which news is produced, distributed, and made meaningful, creating the
broad social and technological forces within which fact-checking operates.
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They do not always do so equitably. The initial power to surface and show-
case verified, fact-checked news online often lies with platform policies and
algorithms that direct information exposure but resist close scrutiny and
oversight—as does the power to intervene to correct misinformation and
counter disinformation after the fact.
Technological Politics and the 2016
US Presidential Election
One of the most powerful motivations for the partnership is the increas-
ingly technological nature of politics and the 2016 US presidential elec-
tion. Chronicled by media scholars across multiple elections and con-
texts,62 63 64 65 66 it is increasingly difficult to talk about technology com-
panies and electoral politics as empirically separate phenomena.
Personnel from technology companies embed themselves within electoral
campaigns; platforms sponsor electoral events and customize their user
experiences for debates, conventions, and elections; and political parties
spend considerable resources building technological infrastructures designed
to mimic and leverage social media platforms and online advertising sys-
tems.67 Fact-checking that tries to counter partisan mis- and disinformation
must contend not only with traditional campaign machinery, but political
operations that are often intertwined with the very same technologies and
practices that fact-checkers are trying to use to spread counter-partisan
narratives.
It is beyond the scope of this report to analyze the large body of liter-
ature about the use of social media and disinformation campaigns by par-
tisan actors during the 2016 presidential election campaign, but that pro-
tracted event is one of the most identifiable influences on the fact-checking
partnership. There is no shortage of debate about what types of misleading
and false information circulated during the campaign68 69 70 and whether
such material impacted the election outcome.71 In Congressional hearings,
without making specific commitments to changing practices, platform com-
pany executives apologized for the role their companies played in helping
to spread false and misleading electoral content.72 Since the election, some
researchers have additionally critiqued the press’s own susceptibility to fake
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news, arguing that journalists let themselves be led by partisan sources of
misinformation and, ultimately, were the one who amplified misleading and
false stories.73 74
The 2016 election highlighted a tension amongst journalists. They were
often caught trying to figure out how to call out and contextualize the lies
and misleading statements of office holders,75 while simultaneously having
to defend their own work against politicians and fellow media producers
who called fact-checks or undesirable stories “fake news.”76
Shortly after the election, the term “fake news” seemed to quickly lose
what little meaning it ever had, with popular and alternative media spaces
filled with dramatic charges that journalists and politicians were both ly-
ing, that we had entered a post-truth era that would cripple democracy,
and that populism and participatory media had overreached and dramat-
ically wounded the very idea of electoral governance, perhaps irreversibly
so. (While standing by his reporting, one of the earliest and most prolific
journalists covering platforms and electoral “fake news” went on to regret
the term’s popularity and over-application, arguing that the governance and
electoral problems created by a misinforming media system run deeper than
any single phenomenon or platform practice.)77
For fact-checkers, the election both proved their essential democratic role
and uncovered new challenges about how to operate at such large scale, in
real-time, for partisan audiences that seem to process claims and counter-
claims differently. For example, researchers found that, between October
7 and November 14, 2016, although disinformation mostly reached Trump
supporters (who heavily consumed conservative media where disinformation
was more likely to live), Facebook was a “key vector of exposure to fake
news and. . .fact-checks of fake news almost never reached its consumers.”78
This led the Director of the International Fact-Checking Network Alexios
Mantzarlis to conclude that fake news had “a relatively large audience, but
it went deep with only a small portion of Americans. Fact-checkers also
[drew] large audiences, but [didn’t] seem to bring the corrections to those
who most need[ed] to read them.”79
Whether or not “fake news” had a consequential impact on the 2016
presidential election, it was a watershed moment for intersections between
technology and politics, journalists’ and fact-checkers’ relationships to
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The partnership exists as innovations are beginning to surface that threaten
the delicate social, institutional, and technological balances already struck
to fight mis- and disinformation.
New video and audio manipulation technologies are quickly emerging
that make it possible to produce realistic audio-video impersonations, mak-
ing public figures with large amounts of publicly available training data
particularly susceptible to being impersonated by fabricated sound and im-
agery.80 Such technologies have already been used to forge videos of crim-
inal behavior that never happened81 and speeches that President Obama
never gave.82 With sufficiently rich training data, rule systems, and compu-
tational rendering, such technologies become forms of artificial intelligence
that can quickly create believable impersonations.
Such creations can increasingly be disseminated at previously unseen
computational speeds. Estimates vary, but research suggests that more
than half of all internet traffic is produced by automated programs83 and
that vast secondary industries exist to automatically impersonate social me-
dia accounts.84 Between September 1 and November 16, 2016, Russian bots
retweeted Trump 470,000 times (50,000 for Clinton).85 Meanwhile, political
processes in many countries are routinely influenced by “computational pro-
paganda” systems that use a mix of automation and media manipulation to
algorithmically spread disinformation and sew political confusion.86
This computational turn is being used by new associations of “trolls,
white nationalists, men’s rights activists, gamergaters, the ‘alt-right,’ and
conspiracy theorists” who employ social media platforms, memes, and bots
to hijack media ecosystems and deceive journalists into adopting their
narratives.87 Such groups are not new to media systems, but are showing
increasing facility with disinformation tools and techniques that give them
a new kind of largely unchecked power.
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Finally, we are beginning to see the emergence of new grassroots,
community-organized initiatives designed to thwart the local power of disin-
formation88 and crowdsource design communities and solutions to computa-
tional disinformation.89
I chronicle these new and upcoming forces not because any one of them
represents the single most important threat or solution to mis- and disin-
formation, but because they represent a new set of technological and social
forces that will likely continue to shape and challenge partnerships between
technology companies and fact-checking organizations.
Tow Center for Digital Journalism
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My goal was to understand the partnership—among Facebook, Politi-
Fact, FactCheck.org, Snopes, ABC News, and the Associated Press—as a
whole, not necessarily focusing on any one member. Among these six or-
ganizations, between August 2017 and January 2018, I conducted a mix
of attributed and on-the-record, background, and off-the-record interviews
with six people, representing four of the partners. I additionally spoke with
two people outside of the partner organizations who have close knowledge
of the partnership’s members, organizations, and processes. Each of the
eight interviews lasted between twenty and ninety minutes, with several
supplemented by follow-up email exchanges.
One partner organization could not be reached and another refused
repeated interview requests, directing me instead to the organization’s
public relations statements. I supplemented these interviews with analyses
of publicly available documents, popular and trade-press accounts, and
secondary scholarly accounts of organizations’ actions in other contexts.
I do not attribute any quotes within this report to individuals or their
organizations. Even though some interviewees agreed to speak on the
record, several would only speak with me anonymously—requesting that
I not identify them or their organization, or quote directly from our in-
terviews. My concern is that revealing the names of people or organiza-
tions who agreed to be named may, through a relatively simple process of
elimination within a small group of people who know each other well, in-
advertently reveal the identities or affiliations of those I agreed to grant
anonymity. I understand that by not attributing anyone’s quotes I am per-
haps not meeting the expectations of those who wanted to be named, but
my conclusion was that a desire for attribution risks harming the need for
anonymity, especially in such a small group.
I also made the decision not to attribute any quotes out of a desire
to focus on the partnership as a whole and not any particular organiza-
tion, as well as to demonstrate how researchers might create network-level
interview-based accounts of organizational partnerships. Pointedly, if re-
searchers can create intellectually insightful and professionally useful ac-
counts of organizational partnerships without revealing identities, then
perhaps employers at both technology companies and news organizations—
who have formally or tacitly told their employees not to communicate with
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researchers or journalists at all or only under unrealistically restrictive non-
disclosure legal agreements—might realize that there are constructive and
minimally risky ways of publicly talking about proprietary processes. Of
course, I understand the limitations of making the partnership my primary
object of study and level of analysis, and of granting broad anonymity: it
may be harder for readers to contextualize the interview data, scrutinize
my interpretations and recommendations, or use this report to help hold
accountable individual people or organizations.i
i. For a thoughtful, recent discussion of researchers negotiating ground rules with
informants working within news and technology organizations, and granting different
types of attribution, see Technology Firms Shape Political Communication: The Work
of Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, and Google With Campaigns During the 2016 U.S.





The partnership essentially involves Facebook and its news and fact-
checking partners collaborating to manage a flow of stories that may be
considered false. Through a proprietary process that mixes algorithmic and
human intervention, Facebook identifies candidate stories; these stories are
served to the five news and fact-checking partners through a partners-only
dashboard that ranks stories according to popularity; partners indepen-
dently choose stories from the dashboard, do their usual fact-checking work,
and then append their fact-checks to the stories’ entries in the dashboards.
Facebook uses these fact-checks to adjust whether and how it shows poten-
tially false stories to its users.
Most broadly, Facebook and its partners have created a fact-checking
infrastructure. By infrastructure I mean a set of social and technological
relationships that is:
• embedded within “other structures, social arrangements and technolo-
gies,”90 (e.g., the partnership is integrated with Facebook’s existing
architectures and fact-checkers’ ways of working)
• transparent to use without requiring reinvention or assembly for each
task (e.g., the partnership and dashboard are largely stable and self-
sustaining)
• scoped beyond a single event or site of practice (e.g., the dashboard is
not customized for partners or used) idiosyncratically
• learned as a member of a group that agrees on its taken-for-grantedness
(e.g., the dashboard is most often just used without critique, not debated
or interrogated on every use)
• shaping and shaped by conventions within communities of practice (e.g.,
people at individual fact-checking organizations decide how the dash-
board is used and how stories are selected)
• embodied in standards that define the nature of acceptable use and
replication (e.g., the dashboard and partners signal which stories are
more or less likely to be fact-checked)
• built on an installed base of other infrastructures with similar charac-
teristics (e.g., the partnership relies on established assumptions and
traditions like the idea of popularity on social media or what defines a
“good” fact-check)
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• visible only when it breaks down91 ii—e.g., the dashboard and partner-
ship primarily receive attention from partners or from the general public
when story popularities seem nonsensical or when “fake news” is per-
ceived as powerful.
This infrastructural way of thinking helps to show not only partners’
different social and cultural assumptions, but also how standards, practices,
values, and disagreements appear in the design, meaning, and use of tech-
nologies. Aligned with Nielsen and Ganter,92 my aim was to follow both
the partnership’s operational dynamics—tracing its practices, functions,
metrics, memberships—show how its strategic priorities appeared in the
infrastructure that encoded its assumptions, goals, and metrics of success.
The dashboard and workflows were the primary coordinating infrastruc-
tures.
Partners had little operational contact with each other. Except for one
meeting held when the group was under public scrutiny and partners
wanted to discuss the collaboration, no one mentioned any regular meet-
ings, shared best practices, or discussed a collective voice.
The partnership’s dynamics play out in ten dimensions, each discussed
below. While these dynamics are conceptually distinct, they are not mu-
tually exclusive and inevitably overlap and intertwine with each other.
Although some of their details may have changed since writing this report,
the categories seem stable and empirically well supported enough to show
the partnership’s workings.
Origin Stories
I heard no single origin story shared among all partners, but rather a set
of events and forces, which appeared more or less prominently in different
narratives that motivated the partnership’s establishment. In describing
why the partnership was created in the first place, partners variously fore-
grounded:
ii. While this definition heavily relies on Star and Ruhleder (1996) some of the in-
terpretations and rephrasings come from an article I published in 2013 in American
Behavior Science called “Press-Public Collaboration as Infrastructure: Tracing News
Organizations and Programming Publics in Application Programming Interfaces.”
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• the 2016 US presidential election and widespread public perception that
“fake news” had led to the Trump presidency;
• fact-checkers’ desires to scale and speed up work they had already been
doing for months after independently observing misinformation upticks;
• Facebook employees’ feelings that the company was somehow—in a way
it did not entirely understand or did not admit publicly—at least par-
tially responsible for the propagation of election misinformation, and
that a coordinated and committed response was required that would
both protect the platform against bad actors and encourage the propaga-
tion of content consistent with its community standards;
• the need to continue and refine Facebook-initiated outreaches to news
and fact-checking organizations, as a way of more publicly iterating on
and deploying initiatives the company had been working on internally for
months;
• perception among some partners that Facebook’s senior executives
needed a quick and high-profile announcement to show that they had
heard the public’s discontent and that they would make amends, a move
that some partners saw as primarily a public relations tactic and a way
of avoiding formal regulation;
• a recognition by some partners that since much of their traffic came
from Facebook, they needed to be “in the room” where decisions were
being made about the platform’s relationship to fact-checking organiza-
tions, even if they did not fully believe that there was a real, urgent, and
tractable misinformation problem that Facebook needed to solve; and
• a public letter from the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN)
calling on Facebook to accept responsibility for its role in misinformation
ecosystems, and work with news and fact-checking organizations who
had agreed to follow a “code of principles”93
Although all partners consistently mentioned the IFCN letter, I heard
partners across all my interviews emphasize that the partnership was con-
sistent with their existing work, saying that news organizations had always
been concerned with truthful reporting, and Facebook had always been
concerned about the “quality and integrity” of its site. News organizations
often saw their relationships with Facebook as contentious and involv-
ing disingenuous public relations strategies, and the International Fact
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Checking Network had long been trying to organize, professionalize, and
increase the impact of fact-checking. While the election may have sparked
the partnership’s formation, the partnership emerged from long-standing
institutional dynamics.
In December 2016, the partnership was publicly announced. Facebook
independently began working on a “dashboard” that appeared in almost all
of my interviews as a central piece of shared technological infrastructure.
The news and fact-checking partners I spoke with said they had virtually
no input into the creation or design of this dashboard and were skeptical
that Facebook alone had the capability to independently design a solution
to such a complex, multifaceted problem. After the initial partnership
was announced, Facebook product designers and engineers created the
dashboard and then gave partners access to it.
Although no partner would provide me access to the dashboard or show
me screenshots of it, all described it and the associated workflow similarly.
More about this dashboard will appear later in this report in sections about
partnership dynamics, but briefly: each partner received the same access
to a central, shared repository of candidate “fake news” stories. Facebook
populated the dashboard with “fake news” stories, without coordinating
with each partner independently around story selection from the dashboard.
After choosing articles at will to fact-check, partners appended to the dash-
board’s entry a link to the URL with their fact-check.
Priorities
Closely related to this diverse collection of origin stories, I heard a compet-
ing set of partnership priorities. Several news and fact-checking partners
stressed that they were effectively public servants—that their job was to
“empower the people who are being talked over,” “reduce deception in pol-
itics,” and follow an “example-driven” process that would reduce both the
prevalence and impact of “fake news.” I heard desires to understand the
“provenance” of fake news, to “empirically examine the worst of the worst
of the election,” and create solutions that would prevent such a failure from
ever happening again.
Several partners also stressed that the work they do is for the public,
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and that since Facebook is one of the major ways of reaching audiences,
they want to work with as many media partners as possible, including
Facebook. One fact-checking partner said, “Our policy is: steal our stuff.
Please.”
I also heard skepticism about Facebook’s priorities, especially that
the platform was using news and fact-checking organizations as “cheap
and effective PR [public relations]” and that this was another step in its
experiment-driven culture. “It’s been tinkering with the democratic pro-
cess for years. . .it’s ugly,” one person told me. Pointedly, another partner
described participating in the partnership as a kind of ethical duty. Even
though this person doubted the partnership’s value, news and fact-checking
organizations need to engage with Facebook because, they said, it was
“privileging dark ads” and creating a platform that has “contributed to
genocides, slave auctioning, and migrant violence.” This interviewee sees
Facebook as a media company and a public utility, and viewed participa-
tion in the partnership as one way to hold the company accountable.
Beyond broad ideological positions, different priorities also played out in
the design and use of the dashboard. Described as a way to get fake news
“out of Facebook” to intermediary fact-checkers, and then “back into Face-
book,” the dashboard largely reflects Facebook’s priorities, according to
participants, not those of news and fact-checking organizations. One part-
ner described the goal as “keeping people on Facebook, to make sure they
look to the platform for context.” Another partner said that Facebook “pro-
vides links to stories that have been flagged by users, or maybe algorithms,
I don’t know” and then we can “rank those stories by popularity.” They
continued, “We’ve asked them a hundred ways to Sunday what popularity
means. We don’t know the mechanism they use to determined popularity.”
Even though this partner did not know how Facebook determined story
popularity, they shared Facebook’s priority of focusing on popularity: “You
don’t want to write about something that hasn’t gone viral because you
don’t want to elevate its visibility. But if there’s something that is being
widely circulated, then you want to debunk it.” Partners did not only align
themselves with Facebook through the platform’s popularity metric—they
also described choosing stories because they fulfilled their individual organi-
zational mandates or because their readers had written to ask about them.
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Still, there were moments when some partners seemed to acknowledge that
they had little choice but to align themselves with the dashboard’s priori-
ties: accepting whatever drove story selection, those stories’ rankings, and
the dashboard’s once-per-day refresh rate.
Sometimes priorities conflicted, or at least diverged. One participant
described deep skepticism about the dashboard’s “popularity” metric, say-
ing they suspected (but could not prove)that stories with high advertising
revenue potential would never appear on that list because “sometimes fake
news can make money.” Facebook, they suspected, would not want to fact-
checkers to debunk high-earning stories. Regardless of whether this is true,
this skepticism paints the dashboard as a place where clashing priorities,
mistrust, or misaligned values can surface through seemingly innocuous
design and engineering choices. It also distinguishes between fact-checkers
motivated by public service and a perception among some partners that
Facebook is primarily an advertising company that ultimately prioritizes
revenue generation over public values.
Related to the dashboard design, which one partner described as “very
word based,”almost all of the partners said the system needed to process
memes, images, and video content far more effectively. One partner said,
“We should be doing work on memes. The partnership doesn’t address
memes, just stories. We’ve had these conversations with Facebook; it’s
something they say they want to do but haven’t done it.”
Echoing another partner’s concern over the company’s financial stakes
in misinformation, one partner said they would like to see the partnership
address advertising content that circulates on the platform to give partners
an opportunity to debunk harmful, paid, partisan content. Finally, several
partners questioned whether Facebook’s priorities may have become em-
bedded in the dashboard design because of types of sources and stories they
are not seeing listed. “We don’t see mainstream media appearing [in the
dashboard]—is it being filtered out? Is it not happening” and “we aren’t
seeing major conspiracy theories or conservative media—no InfoWars on the
list, that’s a surprise.”
The partnership’s priorities thus play out in two places: in partners’
stated motivations and values (why partners say they want to participate)
and in the dashboard’s design and use (the conditions of partnership par-
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ticipation that largely reflect Facebook’s priorities). The dashboard’s emer-
gence from a largely solo, Facebook-driven design process means that it
is difficult for partners to negotiate the terms of their participation on an
operational level, to ensure that their priorities appear in the partnership’s
shared technological infrastructure.
Access and Publicness
I consistently heard most partners say they wanted more public knowledge
about and within the partnership, transparency about its workings, and
critique from outside the partnership that could force change within it. One
partner asked that Facebook be “more forthright and willing” to talk about
details of the partnership and its design, with partners and with the general
public. This same partner called on critics and academics to focus on the
partnership, to make it a central object of concern, and publicly pressure
Facebook to allow members to talk publicly. Another hoped that my report
might help to force Facebook to “provide info about how effective this is,”
saying, “It would be great if they put out a report. We’ve been doing this
for a year. They’re in the best position to know how effective it is. We need
more transparency.”
When asked about the effectiveness of the partnership, another person
said, “I can’t suggest [how] to improve something I can’t evaluate. But
we are probably seeing the largest real-life experiment in countering mis-
information in history and know very little of how it’s going. That’s my
number one concern. Not because I think Facebook is hiding anything, but
because I think we could all learn loads from it.” Many partners I spoke
with expressed interest in this report because they suspected I might dis-
cover things about the partnership that they themselves had been unable to
learn.
Most people required, as a condition of their participation in this study,
that I not name them or their organizations. They stressed the need for
anonymity and discretion not because they or their organizations wanted
the partnership to be secretive, but because Facebook banned them from
speaking about it. By speaking with me, even off the record, several of
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them were taking personal and organizational risks. They did so because
they believed public scrutiny needed to be brought to the partnership.
In refusing to talk to me after multiple approaches, one partner—an
experienced journalist—pointed me to the organization’s public statements
on the partnership, citing Facebook’s gag rule. Partners also felt unable
to comment on each other. Several mentioned that The Washington Post
was originally supposed to be a partnership member, but withdrew for
reasons they thought might be significant but would not comment on. (I
was unable to speak with staff at The Post.)
Beyond being a methodological challenge for this study, I include discus-
sion of these tensions as a partnership dynamic, because the partnership
represents a new kind of journalistic collaboration. News organizations have
always had proprietary relationships with other companies—non-disclosure
agreements are nothing new—but when the world’s largest social media
platform enters into proprietary relationships with major news and fact-
checking organizations that shield those relationships from public scrutiny
or academic inquiry, it becomes incredibly difficult to learn how the con-
temporary press functions and to hold these new platform-publisher hybrids
accountable.
Beyond this particular partnership, the point stands: if Facebook cre-
ates entirely new, immensely powerful, and utterly private fact-checking
partnerships with ostensibly public-spirited news organizations, it becomes
virtually impossible to know in whose interests and according to which
dynamics our public communication systems are operating.
To be clear, I suspect no malicious intent on the part of any partner
and fully appreciate the standardized nature of inter-organizational non-
disclosure agreements. But since this type of partnership is focused on
a novel concern—news organizations’ enrollment in the legitimacy and
efficacy of a privately held but publicly powerful communication system—
it seems that partners and the publics they acknowledge serving should




Leverages and Types of Power
In tracing the reasons the partnership formed, its priorities, and its tensions
around access, several types of inter-organizational leverage and forms of
sociotechnical power surfaced.
The most obvious and concrete form of leverage and power was money.
At the outset Facebook didn’t grant partners any payment for participat-
ing in the network, but starting in approximately June 2017 it offered all
partners compensation. In contrast to public reporting claiming that “in
exchange for weeding through user flags and pumping out fact checks, Face-
book’s partner organizations each receive about $100,000 annually,” several
partners said they had refused to accept any payment from the platform.
They said that accepting such funding would, to them, breach their inde-
pendence. They did not want to be perceived as in service of the platform
but, rather, in partnership with it, as a way to achieve their public aims.
One partner also expressed reticence about relying on such funding,
given its perception that Facebook was continually revising its terms of
partnership with news organizations, pointing to previously defunded ar-
rangements made through the company’s Instant Articles program.
Others said they had gladly accepted money from Facebook. Before the
funding arrived, one partner said they told the company, “OK, you get
what you pay for, we’ll do what we do.” Another said, “Our model is, if
we do the work, you need to buy it. Facebook is using it, and benefitting
from it, so we should be compensated for it.” These more transactional
views of partnership focused on fact-checking as a service that could be
commodified.
Others saw Facebook as holding power over their traffic and having
a monopoly on the phenomenon they cared most about: accessing and
debunking misinformation. They perceived the company’s invitation as
almost non-optional. They acknowledged that the platform brought them
a significant number of readers (none would give an exact number) and
described the partnership as a “way to find things that need to be fact-
checked. The Facebook partnership makes it way easier to do that—it was
a struggle to see what was being shared. . .best part is that Facebook is
doing that work, providing views on what’s popular, what’s circulating.”
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Facebook thus provides a kind of organizational service to fact-checkers,
acting as a gatekeeper to desperately needed online traffic, sources of mis-
information, and metrics of popularity. But, in doing so, Facebook also
holds a kind of leverage in the form of irreplaceable power: it becomes a
key source of the raw goods that fact-checkers process, but also a poten-
tially mission-limiting partner. One partner said, “Our biggest challenge
is figuring out what’s popular,” but worried that the complexity of its
fact-checking would be unreasonably narrowed if it focused only on that
popularity. “Most of the stories [on the dashboard] are SO wrong, they’re
kind of easy.” That same partner later wondered if they were missing out
on fighting more complex and powerful forms of misinformation that did
not meet Facebook’s threshold for popularity.
Not only has Facebook become a gatekeeper of traffic and a monopolistic
source for stories, but it was seen as potentially limiting the complexity and
significance of fact-checking that fell outside of Facebook’s prioritizations
of misinformation. Indeed, one fact-checking partner wished it could drive
fact-checks to Facebook, making Facebook users see what they considered
to be were important rebuttals, instead of having to wait for Facebook to
drive traffic to the partners.
Partners often described feeling powerless within this cycle. While no
partner said that Facebook defined its work, since each could choose which
stories from the dashboard they worked on and use their own standards
of judgment, several said that within the partnership they were essentially
beholden to Facebook’s control over closed computational infrastructure,
which surfaced stories and learned from their selections.
Partners had their own kind of leverage and power, though. Through
their commitments to the International Fact Checking Network’s state-
ments of principles and their own longstanding brands, these organizations
had publicly proven themselves as professionally legitimate, trustworthy,
and, to some extent, beyond the charges of interest and bias that are often
leveled at Facebook. The platform earns associational capital through affili-
ations with network-vetted partners, giving it the ability to say that it does
not define “fake news”—it leaves that to its partners of good standing.
Also, partners have the ability to self-organize. Although all partners
said they rarely coordinated their work with others and had little knowl-
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edge of how other members viewed the partnership, at one particularly
low moment in the collaboration’s operation several partners banded to-
gether to discuss the future of the partnership and articulate a collective
response to their perception that Facebook was taking them for granted,
using them as public relations cover, and ignoring their requests. While
the moment passed and the partnership survived, several partners offered
this as evidence that they retained a shared, independent identity that gave
them both instrumental power as they collectively reconfigured the terms
of the partnership, and symbolic power when they publicly signaled their
displeasure with Facebook through trade press articles.
Categories and Standards
Interviewees also implicitly and repeatedly described the partnership in
terms of standards—standards they attempted to interpret, felt they were
beholden to, that were protected within their own organizations, and that
they saw as both enabling and problematic.
Two partnership functions appeared in categories and standards. The
first set concerns surfacing misinformation, assessing its circulation, and
signaling responses to it. Facebook controls almost all of these standards,
though news and fact-checking partners play small feedback roles. Specif-
ically, in its desire to determine both the “prevalence and severity” of
misinformation, Facebook created and maintains rules for identifying the
existence, spread, and harm of misinformation. That is, despite claiming
that fact-checkers define fake news, the platform identifies the list of can-
didate misinformation stories that fact-checkers see on the dashboard. It
is conceivable that fact-checkers may reject these categorizations—judging
a dashboard item to be true and not needing debunking—but the starting
points for fact-checkers are defined by Facebook.
Beyond the categorical judgment of defining content as fake or not,
Facebook also signals the prevalence and implied severity of the candidate
stories through the “popularity” metric it shows partners through the dash-
board. At the time of these interviews, a simple “popularity” column in
the dashboard was the primary way that fact-checking partners could sort
candidate stories.
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Partners voiced a variety of concerns over the dashboard: “It has a
nebulous popularity bar, but we don’t know what it signifies”; “Facebook
doesn’t say where the [dashboard] list comes from or how it’s made”; “Peo-
ple flag stories at some rate, but I don’t know what the dashboard’s thresh-
old is”; and one partner became suspicious of how the dashboard worked or
whether it was changing without their knowledge when they saw the list of
stories suddenly grow dramatically for no particular reason. As people often
do with computational and algorithmic systems they do not understand but
are forced to use, partners created “folk theories” about how the dashboard
worked and what it meant.iii They made guesses about how the dashboard
worked, why it changed, what its columns signified.
More recently, due to partner feedback, Facebook has added an “impact”
metric, though this category remains similarly opaque to most partners.
These measures of “potentially fake,” “popularity,” and “impact” are deter-
mined through a proprietary combination of user feedback (Facebook users
flagging stories as fake) and computational processing (Facebook algorithms
judging stories as fake). The choices that fact-checkers make about which
dashboard stories to work on, and the fact-checks they upload to the dash-
board, are further categorical inputs that then help Facebook (through an
undisclosed process) determine which stories should continue to surface on
the dashboard and how their popularity should be determined. Debunked
stories are then returned to Facebook, with the company then deciding
what to do with those stories, if or how to display them to users, and what
type of context to give them.
Facebook can thus claim that it does not make final judgments about
which content is fake or real—fact-checkers ostensibly are the experts in
judging the character of dashboard stories—but through a complex and
proprietary set of classifications, it powerfully sets the conditions that
iii. For discussions of algorithmic folk theories, see a 2001 article I wrote for
The Atlantic: http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/04/the-
curious-connection-between-apps-for-gay-men-and-sex-offenders/237340/;
the conference paper “Algorithms Ruin Everything” by Michael A. DeVito:
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3025453.3025659; and “First I ‘Like’ It,




surface and characterize misinformation. These classifications are largely
inaccessible to partners.iv
In the second set of classifications partners have considerably more
control and power. These are the judgments that fact-checkers bring to
stories—that represent their individual and organizational standards, and
that reflect trends in the field of fact-checking as a whole. Partners largely
did not coordinate their work: “I think our dashboard is the same as other
organizations but I’m not sure” and “we tried to do a Slack channel [with
other partners], but it didn’t really work as people got too busy.”
This local control over standards was both the preference of partners—
“we’re not really interested in what competitors are doing”—and aligns
with some members’ understanding of the partnership’s aims as a whole.
Indeed, Facebook publicly states that multiple-fact checks are required be-
fore a story is classified as disputed, and one partner stated that they “like
multiple fact-checkers with multiple methods” because the perceived diver-
sity of methods is thought to make the partnership’s collective judgment
more defensible.
Across these two types of standards and classifications—those that Face-
book uses to populate the dashboard and those that fact-checkers use
within their work—there is a kind of division of categorical labor. There
is largely no coordination amongst fact-checkers, with the work of aggre-
gating judgments and assessing the stability and usefulness of categories
residing mostly within Facebook’s proprietary infrastructure.
Managing Scale
The idea of large-scale fact-checking is at the heart of almost all aspects
of the partnership. From Facebook’s reliance on a mix of mass-scale user
flagging and computational processing, to fact-checkers’ desires to ensure
that their work reaches the greatest number of people quickly and in as
many forms as possible, partners have a shared desire to control how far
and wide misinformation travels.
One of the motivations for designing and deploying the dashboard among
iv. Recall one partner’s frustration that the label “popularity” was still mysterious,
even though they said: “We’ve asked them a hundred ways to Sunday” what it means.
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partners is Facebook’s desire to move some of the work of mass-scale judg-
ment to news and fact-checking organizations. To do this, Facebook needs
to constrain the flow of content it sends to partners, to reduce their work-
load and take into account the relatively small organizational capacity of
many fact-checkers. It is seen as Facebook’s duty to manage the scale of in-
formation, a duty that is tightly tied to the partnership’s desire to minimize
the impact of large-scale misinformation. The need and responsibility to, as
one partner put it, “deal with scale” is inescapable. One fact-checker said,
“Facebook knows how to deal with scale, we don’t.”
That said, many partners described struggling with scale. Some are
confused by how the dashboard represents the large number of potentially
false stories. During one interview, a partner reported that there were
currently “2,200 to 2,300 stories in the queue,” a number roughly confirmed
during a follow-up interview, but they estimated that “about seventy five
percent of them seem to be duplicates.”
Partners often commented that it was hard to know the true scale of
the candidate stories Facebook had identified—or the true scale of the
misinformation problem—because, although the dashboard seemed to have
a very large number of stories, the URLs often looked similar and it was
unclear which stories were circulating uniquely. One partner said that
between December 2016 and December 2017 they completed about ninety
stories through the partnership. They had also submitted over 500 URLs as
misinformation, because several dashboard entries are identical and can be
debunked with the same fact-check.
One partner said they were able to process four to five stories per day
from the dashboard, while another said they submitted about two to three
fact-checks per day. Another reported they usually avoid the problem of
scale altogether because many of the dashboard stories are about celebri-
ties, and their focus is on political fact-checking. One way partners limit
their work amid large-scale misinformation is by narrowly focusing their
work on fact-checking that aligns with their organizational missions. This
suggests a subtle division of labor that leaves news organizations with con-
siderable power. While Facebook may have the power to set scale sizes by
defining categories and dashboard thresholds, fact-checking organizations
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may practically ignore much of this surfeit by declaring it as outside their
purview.
Finally, one partner aptly summarized the ambivalence many members
felt about the seemingly large scale of misinformation by simply saying,
“I can’t entirely answer the question [about scale]. I’d need to identify
how many stories could be done versus how many we’re doing. I don’t
know what the entire universe is, we just do what we’re able to do. My
sense is we could do more if we had more resources. . .I don’t know what
the full scope is.” As with other partnership dynamics, members often
defaulted to simply focusing on their narrow, well-understood domains,
remaining unbothered by the scale of misinformation because they had
little sense of how big the problem was, how much of it was captured by the
Facebook dashboard, and what impact their work had on the overarching
phenomenon.
Timing
With one exception, all partners stressed their desire to get ahead of mis-
information by debunking stories before they could travel far and wide.
Before the Facebook network, one partner said, their work was mostly
prompted by readers’ questions. But, “by the time we answered the ques-
tion, it was usually days after the [misinformation] had gone viral. We
would wait until something had critical mass before we wrote about it,
which felt too late.”
This need to anticipate virality was widely shared across the partnership,
with one member describing it not only as an important part of reducing
misinformation’s impact, but also as a way of reducing fact-checkers’ work-
load and the number of stories in the dashboard.
As with other dimensions of the infrastructure, partners had also formed
folk theories about its timeliness, or just seemed resigned to not knowing
how the system worked: “We don’t know how time works on it, but it
seems pretty quick—an event will happen and then we see it. Probably a
lag of twenty-four hours. We look at it and you can’t really tell; we’re told
it’s updated every day.” All partners similarly expressed uncertainty about
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Facebook’s understanding of speed, but none said they compressed their
own work to keep up with what the dashboard was feeding them:
When we pick something to write about it, it takes a day or two to write
the fact-check. I’m not sure how Facebook’s speed works but we have about
a 24–36 hour turnaround. What we’re doing is the same thing we do with
everything we do on our website there’s a rigorous review process for ev-
erything. . .For any story, there will be four people looking at it—we don’t
want to get our facts wrong, we don’t want to have to correct it or change
ratings.
While no partner said they sped up their process or lowered standards,
several said that the dashboard process needed to be faster and more effi-
cient: “We need to get the time horizon down—if it takes 1,000 people to
flag something as fake, that takes a long time, then it goes to the list and
I don’t get to it. . .this can all take a looooooong time. If too much time
passes between story, debunk becomes less efficient.”
One partner suggested that artificial intelligence (AI) would be the real
“game-changer” for how time worked, and expressed a hope that fact-
checkers would be able to help design these time-keeping AIs.
This was a common sentiment with fact-checkers expressing uncertainty
about how Facebook’s categorizations worked, and skepticism that its
thresholds meaningfully aligned with the sorts of timescales that they
understood fact-checking to require. Indeed, one fact-checker cautioned
against placing too much emphasis on speed and anticipating virality, say-
ing, “It’s never ‘too late’ because fake news stays around for a long time
. . .These stories have long, long, long tails. It doesn’t matter if it takes
fact-checkers a few days to do their work [because] whenever there’s an
opportunity for these stories to reappear, they will.”
As with other dimensions of the partnership, time dynamics play out in
multiple ways: in partners’ folk theories about when fact-checking should
happen; in technological infrastructures that encode rhythms, define new-
ness, and set thresholds; and in people’s aspirations about what they think
fact-checking could be, if future technological infrastructures were designed
to align with what one participant called “fact-time.”
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Automation and ‘Practice Capture’
While no partner expressed grave concern or hope for automated fact-
checking, several described dynamics that suggest a kind of proto-automation
at work, and a phenomenon I call “practice capture.”
As described, to populate the dashboard of potentially misinforming sto-
ries, Facebook uses a combination of user feedback (flagging) and compu-
tational processing (algorithmic guesses about the identify and circulation
of misinformation). The decisions that fact-checkers make about how to
interact with that dashboard—which stories to pick or ignore, which cat-
egories of content to prioritize, which types of stories seem similar, which
types of misinformation are judged egregious, and what types of rebuttals
to make—all feed into a system that Facebook uses to further populate the
dashboard.
Described as a way to improve the quality of the dashboard and the ef-
ficiency of fact-checkers, such a feedback loop is both critical to iteratively
refining an “example-driven” design process (in which humans guide ma-
chines to learn which examples are salient and canonical and which can be
safely ignored), this process is also a way of modeling and operationalizing
fact-checkers’ practices. I call this “practice capture.”
While it is unlikely that these relatively subtle judgements can be com-
pletely automated any time soon, it is more likely, as one partner put it,
that Facebook will gradually shift to focusing fact-checkers on better under-
standing “edge cases” (particularly difficult judgments) and the emerging
practices of bad actors who will continue to innovate misinformation tech-
niques. Thus, fact-checkers will not disappear from these systems and hu-
man judgment will not be displaced by algorithms, but there is a very real
potential that Facebook—through a dashboard-style feedback loop—may
gradually narrow the space within which its human partners work.
It is not inconceivable that the dashboard will gradually become pop-
ulated with fewer stories that the machine learning system fails to under-
stand; instead a greater number of complex cases may appear (the kind of
complexity one partner described longing for in the dashboard). This may
be described as efficiency and a better use of human judgment, but part-
ners should be aware of how their practices are being modeled, which parts
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of their judgments may or may not be represented in these operational-
izations, which aspects of their habits and rituals may become subtly and
obliquely standardized within a machine learning algorithm, which parts of
their expertise become fetishized and valued and which parts are captured
by proprietary systems, and how it should approach the education of its
future professionals if critical (but seemingly “simple”) parts of its practice
are black-boxed and made mundane.
While some partners seemed to appreciate this potential future, others
were skeptical, saying, “I don’t know how you’d be able to replace hu-
mans where you need to do the review” of the misinformation, and write a
fact-check that not only rebuts misinformation but that also addresses the
“implications and ramifications” of false claims. This focus on contexts and
consequences of misinformation requires a level of judgment that this same
partner said was beyond machines:
We also use [fact-checks as] an opportunity to explain how things work. If
there’s some bogus claim, we explain what the process would be if that we
true. For example, for putting someone on the dollar bill—we don’t just say
Obama isn’t going on the bill [rebutting a false claim], we say how someone
would get on a bill.
Automation and practice capture were not core concerns of the partnership,
but a close reading of its infrastructure and its different aspirations creates
an image of what kind of automation may be on the horizon, the kind that
some partners aspire to and others fear.
Impact
Concerns about transparency, access, and leverage was often closely related
to questions of impact. Most simply, it was often hard for partners to tell
what effect, if any, their work and the partnership were having. Addition-
ally, across the partnership there were different concerns about what impact
partners ideally should have—what should happen to misinformation they
identify.
Partners framed many of these concerns as a worry over Facebook’s
dominance of partnership knowledge. In response to my question about
what impact they thought the partnership was having, one partner said
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only, “I just can’t answer that question without data that only Facebook
has.” Citing a leaked email in which Facebook claimed that a “news story
that’s been labeled false by Facebook’s third-party fact-checking partners
sees its future impressions on the platform drop by 80 percent,”94 several
partners expressed skepticism about this number, saying, “I don’t know
how that number is calculated” and “we have no public proof of that” and
“I can’t fact-check that claim, and that’s a problem.”
One partner said that after they fact-checked a dashboard story and up-
loaded their report to Facebook, “We don’t get any information about these
stories or what’s happened to them. What they’re telling the public is no
more than what we’re getting. We don’t know and we don’t understand
how they’re using it.” Several partners expressed a vague sense of embar-
rassment over their ignorance about impact, with one describing the entire
partnership as an “ongoing experiment we don’t really know much about.”
Combined with the leaked Facebook email, these consistent statements
of ignorance suggest that the partnership shares no single set of clearly
stated impact measurements. Facebook may have reason to believe its
eighty percent number, and reason to be happy with this as evidence of the
partnership’s success, but such confidence and contentment are not shared
by other partners who have far less insight into the infrastructure’s inner
workings.
Indeed, Facebook’s definitions of success entail three broad logics: noth-
ing Facebook does should harm or fail to abide by its community stan-
dards; some content is probably consistent with community standards but
should not circulate on the platform regardless (a “complicated gray area”);
and when exposure to harmful content does happen, the harm should be
minimized.
From Facebook’s perspective, the partnership is successful if it reduces
exposure to misinformation, helps to remove content that violates commu-
nity standards, and provides context to information that does get through.
To the extent that partners work within these measures of success and have
little recourse of their own to find other evidence of success or failure in the
partnership, they implicitly agree to Facebook’s metrics and are enrolled in
the service of its definition of success.
A few partners found other measures of success that they could deter-
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mine for themselves. PolitiFact publicly stated that the sheer scale of the
partnership’s accomplishments and its own organizational reach was one
measure of success: “Sharockman said PolitiFact has used it to check about
2,000 URLs since the partnership began—which is a lot, considering the
outlet has published about 15,000 fact checks in its entire 10-year history.
‘To cover that much ground in one year with this Facebook tool is a sign of
success.’ ”95
Another partner similarly stated that they had increased their workload
to some positive effect and were receiving funding to support it: “We’re
doing more now than we have been able to do, which is good. It seems to
be effective enough—seems to be some level of effectiveness here.” Others
offered the continued existence of the partnership itself as evidence of suc-
cess, saying that the ability of fact-checking organizations to come together
and continue in partnership with Facebook indicated that the partnership
was valuable.
Even without considering Facebook’s role, several partners described
being proud that the partnership showed how fact-checking as a field was
mature enough to sustain collaboration—that it has “raised the profile
of fact-checking [and is] helping to reach new people and educate in new
ways.”
A final dimension of impact concerns not whether the partnership itself
is successful, but what partners think should happen to misinformation
identified through the partnership. Very much echoing a marketplace model
of speech in which the answer to bad speech is more good speech, all part-
ners agreed that misinformation should be removed from Facebook’s main
newsfeed but that it was acceptable—and even desirable—for such mis-
information to continue to exist on web pages that the platform did not
surface.
As evidence of this uniformity of diagnosis but disagreement over a rem-
edy, all partners cited America’s Last Line Of Defense as an example of a
website that consistently spreads mis- and disinformation. And while some
partners thought Facebook should ban the site from its platform, others
thought it should simply be moved into a secondary area, or that it was
sufficient to attach fact-checks to stories that circulated on the website.
Partners largely defined “success” not as the eradication of existing mis-
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information, but the widespread propagation of fact-checks that would,
ultimately, prevent misinformation from having political power. One part-
ner thought Facebook should “put fake news in a ghetto—they’ve got to go,
they can’t be intermixed with the newsfeed. Put them somewhere where
it’s clear that they’re not real. This means Facebook admitting they’re a
media company, not a tech company.”
Others agreed but cautioned that “Facebook’s a private company [with]
the ability to set rules and policies and take action they want to” and that
they did not think websites should be banned from Facebook because some-
one’s “motivation for sharing might be complicated. . .and [we] don’t want
to police the internet.” Still others echoed this perspective, saying that it’s
sufficient that “our fact-check is attached [to a disputed story on Facebook]
so people know to think about it as they share. . .As a First Amendment
supporter I find that cool.”
One partner departed significantly from the majority and argued for
much more fundamental, existential change. Questioning the partnership’s
ability to regulate itself, they said “Facebook needed a [regulation] team
from the outside. . .It needs an outside government to monitor them. .
.Break up the company, they should not be going into news.” While this
type of foundational critique was rare, it echoes the critiques levied against
the company by academics and activists who suggest that the critical ques-
tion is not whether platforms like Facebook successfully fight misinforma-
tion or follow the right metrics of success; rather this partner argued for a
far more radical intervention that would limit Facebook’s reach and power.
There is a diversity of perspectives on the partnership’s success and im-
pact, from tacit acceptance of Facebook’s power and the need to outsource
fact-checking judgment, to radical rejection of the platform and an existen-
tial critique of its ability to function responsibly in this space.
Change Management
The final dynamic I consistently heard about from partners concerned the
management of the partnership itself. While several partners expressed
repeated appreciation for Facebook’s attention to their work, to the phe-
nomenon of misinformation, and for the platform’s providing resources that
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allowed them to hire staff and grow their capacities, none of the members
was satisfied with the partnership’s current state.
Several critiqued Facebook’s repeated promises that it would hold regu-
lar summits, have detailed meetings with partners, and share metrics data
and infrastructure specifics. One partner who expressed little dissatisfaction
beyond a desire to know more about the impact of fact-checking essentially
said that, except for information exchanged through the dashboard, the
partnership was virtually non-existent: “I don’t have much back and forth.
I don’t really hear from them.” While more recent moves by the company
may alleviate some of these concerns—a roundtable with Facebook and the
partners was held in February—complaints about the company’s respon-
siveness were widespread during the period of time these interviews were
conducted.
Other partners argued that for a company of Facebook’s size and power,
the resources it was spending on this partnership were incredibly small,
almost token. Several partners said they could be much more effective if
they had more resources, and another cautioned that Facebook seemed to
be taking a “tool-first approach” to this partnership: “There is no one right
tool or solution. This is an ongoing challenge. We’re always going to need
new resources.”
Others expressed a desire to grow the partnership with Facebook, to
make infrastructures with the platform instead of simply receiving access to
a tool it built. Still others wanted to create ways to work beyond Facebook,
to design fact-checking techniques across multiple platforms, and in differ-
ent languages and cultures. While nearly everyone expressed a desire for
more transparency, one partner said that this word is often used without
precision and that the partnership needed to define exactly which parts of
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As the networked press continues to evolve at the intersections of tech-
nology design, editorial production, platform policies, and large-scale,
real-time action of people and algorithms, we will continue to see strate-
gic organizational partnerships emerge between news organizations and
technology companies. Journalists will continue to wade into computational
territory and technologists will increasingly find themselves unable to claim
that they are not part of the media. As new bad actors and new deceptive
practices emerge, news and fact-checking organizations trying to create and
circulate truthful and vetted material will find themselves managing an
ever-growing set of tools and techniques.v While some of those tools and
techniques will be internally directed processes over which they have consid-
erable control, many will also likely depend on relationships with platform
companies.
Facebook is clearly a key platform in these dynamics because of its mas-
sive user base, cultural prominence in discussions of misinformation and
political power, and (with Google) its duopolistic command of online adver-
tising revenue. It is also a critical platform to watch because of its ability
to initiate and shape partnerships with news and fact-checking organiza-
tions. Since it is practically impossible to avoid having any relationship
with Facebook as a news organization, it is critical to understand how, why,
when, and with whom it partners. Such partnerships are both new and
powerful objects of study and sites for advocacy.
This report has tried to contextualize and trace one such partnership
between Facebook and five US news and fact-checking organizations. As
a model for future studies of such partnerships, I argue that they must be
historically and institutionally situated, positioned within emerging so-
cial and political debates, and linked to the design and invention of new
technologies—which may seem neutral but are actually tightly tied to part-
nership aims.
v. For example, media researchers have seen false and misleading information
spread quickly and widely through Facebook-owned WhatsApp in Brazil, Kenya,
and India. (Abdi Latif Dahir, “WhatsApp and Facebook Are Driving Kenyas
Fake News Cycle,” Quartz, July 24, 2017, https://qz.com/1033181/whatsapp-and-
facebook-are-driving-kenyas-fake-news-cycle-ahead-of-august-elections/) (Nic Dias,
“The Era of Whatsapp Propaganda Is Upon Us,” Foreign Policy, August 17, 2017,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/17/the-era-of-whatsapp-propaganda-is-upon-us/.)
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In this partnership, we see those varied aims and dynamics play out in
how partners articulate their origin stories, set priorities, offer or shield
access, leverage their unique powers, categorize and standardize human
behavior, manage scale, set rhythms, operationalize practices, measure
impact, and manage their collaborations. I have described what this part-
nership does and sketched how its members see the collaboration’s future,
but what questions should other partnerships ask themselves?
Acknowledging that my ultimate interest lies not within this particular
partnership but in the broader space of press-platform partnerships, what
questions should future partners—platforms and publishers—ask before
starting collaborations?
What values motivate the partnership?
Be specific about what problems, events, case studies, and archetypes are
driving the desire to collaborate. Partners likely have unspoken visions of
the past and idealized images of the future that implicitly motivate their
intentions. Be sure to state these explicitly, identify where these images
align, where they clash, and what accommodations, if any, can be made for
competing motivations.
What terms and keywords does the partnership rest upon?
Specifying clearly the key definitions that motivate the partnership (e.g.,
“news,” “skill„ “algorithm,” “data,”) can help to bound the partnership
within shared terminology and identify sources of misalignment.
What infrastructures does the partnership use, where do they
come from, and how are they updated?
Co-creating the partnership’s tools, practices, and data structures (e.g.,
in this case, the dashboard of potentially false stories and the algorithms
that populate it) can help broker trust amongst partners. If only one
partner has the power to engineer, understand, and experiment with the
infrastructures that sort, analyze, circulate, and change data, it is prac-
tically impossible to see how the partnership as a whole is accountable.
If all partners can shape the infrastructure, then all partners can assume
responsibility.
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What types of power exist in the partnership?
Some partners have financial capital, and some have audience reach.
Others have historical legitimacy and cultural appeal, while some have
start-up flexibility, technological agility, editorial skill, or bring relationships
from unfamiliar domains. Be explicit about the kind of resources partners
have, the types of resources they would like to obtain through the partner-
ship, and the kinds of resources they are willing to give up.
How will accountability be established and judged?
Be clear about who the partnership sees itself as accountable to, what
it must be held accountable for, and how good-faith due process will be
created among people with different perspectives on public service, law and
regulation, professional ethics, and marketplace success. What aspects of
the partnership will be visible to partners themselves, to investors, and to
broader audiences?
What will the partnership produce?
Thinking as broadly and creatively as possible, who has ownership over
the different outputs of the partnership, how will that ownership be speci-
fied and valued, and under what conditions can products be taken outside
of the partnership into new contexts? Specifying partnership outputs can
help surface different motivations, power, and valuations.
What makes the partnership successful and who has the power to
define that success?
Thinking carefully about the partnership’s consequences and envisioned
impacts, how will success be measured, when is it expected to happen, and
what contingencies exist for recognizing emergent and unanticipated forms
of failure and success?
How can partners be removed from or added to the partnership?
What foundational principles would have to be violated to eject a part-
ner, and then adopted to add one? Being specific about what types of
people or organizations are seen as consistent with the partnership can
help clarify the partnership’s boundaries, what the original partnership is
designed to achieve, and the accomplishments it envisions for the future.
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While not exhaustive or necessarily crucial to all platform-press partner-
ships, this set of questions is, in some form, at the heart of this partnership
and may be a helpful guide to journalists and technologists alike consider-
ing creating new organizational relationships.
Most broadly, partnerships between news organizations and technology
companies need to deeply consider their public obligations. While publish-
ers and platforms may see themselves strictly as private entities with the
freedom to define for themselves their public responsibilities, when they
meet, they take on a new form of power that needs a new kind of account-
ability. With an almost unassailable, opaque, and proprietarily guarded
collective ability to create and circulate news, and signal to audiences what
can be believed, this is a power that cannot live within any single set of
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